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Carl F. Stychin*

A Postmodern Constitutionalism:
Equality Rights, Identity Politics,
and the Canadian National
Imagination

In the 1990s, "identity" has become the centrepiece of theoretical work
in a variety of disciplines. We now know that, in the conditions of late
modem (or postmodem) society, identity is complex-it is fragmented,
intersected, subject to alteration, socially constructed and it exhibits only
a partial fixity at any moment. Most important, identities are to be valued,
respected, and understood on their own terms. However, we also have
relearned (if we ever forgot) that identities can be dangerous and fatal,
especially when they coalesce in the form of nationalism. In this article,
I will explore the intersection of nationalism and identity in the Canadian
context and will use as an example to explore these broad issues, the
constitutional recognition of sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of
discrimination.
My reasons for focusing on sexual orientation are two-fold. First, it is
interesting because of the relatively recent fairly broad acceptance within
legal discourse of sexual orientation as a protected category under the
CanadianCharterof Rights andFreedoms. IIwill argue that the Charter
itself, and particularly section 15, ensures the protection and development of newly emerging identities. The Chartercan be viewed through
the lens of postmodemism, and specifically, postmodem notions of
identity. Sexual orientation represents an identity which has come to be
legally recognized despite the fact that it is not an explicitly listed ground
under section 15. Second, I focus on sexual orientation because, as an
amalgam of identities, it presents a study in the transgressive power of
"new" identities to shift the frontiers and borders of citizenship and
nationalism. If the Western nation has been defined and maintained by the
creation of a devalued "other" placed outside the boundaries of the state,

* Lecturer in Law, Keele University, United Kingdom. Earlier versions of this article were
presented in 1993 at the British Association of Canadian Studies Annual Meeting, Cambridge
University; the Law and Society Association Annual Conference, Chicago; and the Canadian
Law and Society Association Conference, Carleton University, Ottawa. The author thanks the
participants for their helpful comments and, in particular, thanks Didi Herman, Shauna Van
Praagh, Gillian More, Joel Bakan and Marianne Constable.
1. Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. I I [hereinafter Charter].
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then one such expulsion traditionally has been the "homosexual." Once
sexual orientation is accepted as an illegitimate basis of discrimination
and recognized as a legal, political, and cultural identity worthy of
protection, then the definition of citizenship (and correspondingly the
composition of the nation) broadens and deepens along sexual lines.
I also will argue that Canada may be particularly situated to accomplish the postmodern political agenda of facilitating democratic dialogue
across an ever expanding range of identities. This is because Canadian
nationalism itself is signified in part by our own "otherness"-an absence
of essential definition that creates space for identities which are articulated from the vantage point of social groups. Indeed, such group
identities can come to be defined in nationalistic terms. Thus, "Canadian"
becomes an identity open to resignification and intersection through an
ever increasing variety of perspectives engaged in a dialogue guaranteed
by the Charter.
In the end, this openness of the Canadian identity leaves it a source of
both great potential and peril. Ultimately, the issue is whether Canada can
survive given its awareness of a lack of essence. In other words, is a sense
of oneself as multiplicitous and provisional sufficient to provide the
centripetal force to prevent complete fragmentation along the lines of the
various identities of which the state is composed? The postmodern option
of democratic dialogue, I will argue in conclusion, may provide the only
alternative to the violence of rupture that today is so readily associated
with the disintegration of states in the name of national aspiration.
I. A Postmodern Identity Politics
Throughout this article, I focus upon an identity politics which I label
"postmodern." In so doing, I synthesize a cluster of ideas concerning
identities, politics and rights which increasingly is applied within legal
discourse. 2 The premise is that the process of identity formation is
continually engaged by the individual subject and moreover is politically
charged. Thus, there is a politics of identity that centres upon the plurality
of subject positions in which each individual is constituted. Identity

2. For an introduction to this emerging literature on identity, see, e.g., J. Rutherford, ed.,
Identity: Community, Culture,Difference (London: Lawrence &Wishart, 1990); "The Identity
in Question: A Special Issue" (1992) 61 October, I.M. Young, Justice and the Politics of
Difference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); S. Lash & J. Friedman, eds.,
Modernity and Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992). Of course, "identity politics"
emerged, not from a vacuum, but from a history of minority practices and theory which
highlighted the political implications of oppressed identities.
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politics examines "the fields in which power is thought to operate, and
critically analyzes in terms of domination the various universal identities
now associated with modernism. '3 The universal standpoint is rejected in
favour of the multiplicity of viewpoints and intersections of difference
that better reflect the conflictory nature of identity and "highlight ...that
each person is embedded in a matrix of social and psychological factors
that interact in different contexts." 4 Identity necessarily is contingent,
shifting, open to revision, unstable, and dependent upon the relationship
of current and future political allegiances. Identity politics also is identified with the "project of building new political groupings with categories
neglected in previous modem politics ... identity politics attempts to
mobilize a politics based on the construction of political and cultural
identities through political struggle and commitment."5 Law and the legal
discourse of equality rights provides a forum where that political struggle
involving newly emerging identities and social movements can occur.6
Much of the theoretical grounding for this postmodern explication of
7
identity and subjecthood has been undertaken by Laclau and Mouffe.
They argue not only that identities are formed by the exercise of power
in oppressive ways, but also that the formation of new identities can be
undertaken by oppressed groups. If subjecthood is plural-a point of
merging of a variety of subject positions which come to be articulated
through discourse-then it is only through the conditions of political
struggle that identities are established in any particular configuration.
Crucially, Laclau and Mouffe argue that the political system never
achieves a total closure that prevents the development of new and
politically resistant identities articulated in the social arena.
The analysis has implications for a progressive political project, the
goal of which becomes the establishment of a precarious and constructed
unity amongst the constantly emerging partial identities of social subjects.' This approach claims an anti-essentialist stance in its articulation
of the "precarious character of every identity and the impossibility of

3. M. Smiley, "Gender Justice Without Foundations" (1991) 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1574 at 1579.
4. J.C. Williams, "Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modem Path Beyond
Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory" (1991) Duke L.J. 296 at 307.
5. S. Best & D. Kellner, Postmodern Theory: CriticalInterrogations(New York: Guilford

Press, 1991) at 205.
6. On the relationship of equality rights in Canada and the new social movements, see D.
Herman, "Beyond the Rights Debate" (1993) 2 Soc. & Leg. Stud. 25.
7. See generally E. Laclau & C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a
Radical DemocraticPolitics(London: Verso, 1985).

8. See ibid. at 87: "The political meaning of a local community movement, of an ecological
struggle, of a sexual minority movement, is not given from the beginning: it crucially depends

upon its hegemonic articulation with other struggles and demands."
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fixing the sense of the 'elements' in any ultimate literality." 9 At the same
time, articulation of identities itself organizes and constitutes social
relations "as a means for refusing the acceptability of any pre-existing
notion of the social totality.""l
Under a postmodern interrogation, then, identity ceases to hold any
"naturalness" or essence: "the appearance of a new identity is not
inevitable or determined, not something that was always there simply
waiting to be expressed, not something that will always exist in the form
it was given in a particular political movement or at a particular historical
moment."' 1 The subject also is capable of intervention in the process
through self-definition and articulation. As Judith Butler has recognized,
the "subject is neither a ground nor a product, but the permanent
possibility of a certain resignifying process. ' 12 This openness to
resignification is explained in terms of the necessity of a devalued "other"
against which identities are constituted and continually maintained, and
the "other" in turn may subvert the identity through its own articulation.13
This relationship of mututal dependence results in instability.
II. Canada:The FirstPostmodern State?
Having examined the construction of individual and group identities
within the conditions of postmodernity, I turn to the construction of the
national identity. Specifically, I examine why it may be appropriate to
draw upon postmodern theories of identity within the context of the
Canadianidentity. What is particular about Canada that might facilitate
the articulation of identities and the development ofLaclau's and Mouffe's
radical democratic pluralism? The answer might be found in the construction of the national identity. To the extent that a Canadian national
identity is recognized as socially constructed, contingent and transformable, Canadian society may assume an openness to new identities. In
other words, if the Canadian identity has been less than successful in
fixing upon an "other," there may be a greater openness to the articulation
of many conflicting identities defined by membership in the Canadian

9. Ibid. at 96.
10. A. Woodiwiss, Social Theory After Postmodernism (Winchester, Mass.: Pluto Press,
1990) at 65.
11. J.W. Scott, "Experience" in J. Butler &J.W. Scott, eds., FeministsTheorize the Political
(New York: Routledge, 1992) 22 at 33.
12. J. Butler, "Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of'Postmodemism"' in
Butler & Scott, eds., ibid., 3 at 13.
13. See ibid. at 15-16: "Identity categories are never merely descriptions, but are always
normative, and as such, exclusionary.... [Tihe very term becomes a site of permanent
openness and resignifiability."
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community. Identity thus becomes an open site for the contestation over
the national imaginary.
Like all processes of identity formation, the construction of a national
identity has been dependent upon the constitution of the coherent national
subject. That subject must be continually recreated to prevent the erosion
of its essential appearance. Its construction is dependent upon the "other"
and yet, because the construction of identity is never total, national
identity also is under constant threat from the appearance of the "other"
within its own borders.' 4 Yet, there is no single element against which
nationality is defined. 5 The maintenance of national identity demands an
obsessive focus upon the essence of nation.' 6 It requires the creation of
national boundaries against which one may be inside or out depending
upon the location of an identity within the grid of nationalism. Through
the narrative trope of nationalism, a disembodied and abstract national
subject is maintained with varying degrees of success.' 7 Those "others"
within the physical borders of the nation, but defined as outside its social

14. See A. ParkeretaL,"Introduction" inA. ParkeretaL,eds.,NationalismsandSexualities
(New York: Routledge, 1992) 1 at 5:
nationality is a relational term whose identity derives from its inherence in a system of
differences. In the same way that "man" and "woman" define themselves reciprocally
(though never symmetrically), national identity is determined not on the basis of its own
intrinsic properties but as a function of what it (presumably) is not. Implying "some
element of alterity for its definition," a nation is ineluctably "shaped by what it
opposes." But the very fact that such identities depend constitutively on difference
means that nations are forever haunted by their various definitional others.
15. See E. Sedgwick, "The Age of Wilde" in Parker etaL, eds., ibid., 235 at 241:
The "other" of the nation in a given political or historical setting maybe the pre-national
monarchy, the local ethnicity, the diaspora, the trans-national corporate, ideological,
religious, or ethnic unity, the sub-national locale or the ex-colonial, often contiguous
unit; the colony may become national vis-a-vis the homeland, or the homeland become
national vis-a-vis the nationalism of its colonies; the nationalism of the homeland may
be coextensive with or oppositional to its imperialism; and so forth. Far beyond the
pressure of crisis or exception, it may be that there exists for nations, as for genders,
simply no normal way to partake of the categorical definitiveness of the national, no
single kind of "other" of what a nation is to which all can by the same structuration be
definitively opposed.
16. See H.K. Bhabha, "DissemiNation" in H.K. Bhabha, ed., Nation andNarration(New
York: Routiedge, 1992) 291 at 296: "the demand for a holistic, representative vision of society
could only be represented in a discourse that was at the same time obsessively fixed upon, and
uncertain of, the boundaries of society, and the margins of the text."
17. See D.E. Pease, "National Identities, Postmodern Artifacts, and Postnational Narratives"
(1992) 19:1 Bound. 1 at 3: "The national narrative produced national identities by way of a
social symbolic order that systematically separated an abstract, disembodied subject from
resistant materialities, such as race, class, and gender.... [T]he socially disenfranchised
figures within emancipatory political movements understand that the universality of the
national identity depends on their externality for its integrity."
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construction, thus are alien to the nation and disenfranchised from the
national identity. As Donald Pease has argued, the success of the
construction of nationhood depends upon the ability to take on this
essentialist tone:
When understood from within the context of the construction of an
imagined national community, the negative class, race, and gender categories of these subject peoples were not a historical aberrationbut a structural
necessity for the construction of a national narrative whose coherence
depended upon the internal opposition between Nature's Nation and
peoples understood to be constructed of a "different nature."'"
Of course, the boundaries of nationality and citizenship retain a
measure of openness to the incorporation of new citizens. The nation thus
is in a "process of hybridity" by which new peoples are integrated while
the nation maintains an essential appearance. 9 The frontiers of nationhood are capable of fluctuation as new identities are allowed space within
the narrative of nationalism.
Postmodern theory has responded to this construction of national
boundaries. Instead of fixed borders through which new identities may be
permitted to enter and assume the badge of nationalism, postmodems
seek to reveal the national identity as a permanent site of contestation over
content. The nation thus is exposed as provisional and subject to redefinition:
the national subjects, who had previously derived their sense of identity
from incomplete identification with the meta-social subject of the national
narrative, could become dislocated from this structure and could rediscover national identity itself as a permanent instability, an endless antagonism between figures integrated within ever changing social imaginaries
and singularities forever external to them.20
The nation becomes a site of potential antagonism between competing
social imaginaries emerging from the "cultural difference and the heterogeneous histories of contending peoples, antagonistic authorities, and
tense cultural locations. ''21 Under this pluralistic approach, narratives
from new, previously unheard voices appear, articulating "[c]ounternarratives of the nation that continually evoke and erase its totalizing
boundaries-both actual and conceptual-[and] disturb those ideological manoeuvres through which 'imagined communities' are given essentialist identities." 22 The borderland between the national self and the other

18. Ibid.at4.
19.
20.
21.
22.

H.K. Bhabha, "Introduction: Narrating the Nation" in Bhabha, ed., supra note 16, 1 at 4.
Pease, supra note 17 at 6.
Bhabha, "DissemiNation," supra note 16 at 299.
Ibid.at 300.
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thus is wrenched open, undermining the essence of nationhood? The
narratives of nationalism that emerge, for example, from some new social
movements may challenge the unitary and totalizing voice of "the
people." Within the conditions of late modem society, a shift may be
experienced away from the homogeneity of the discourse of nationalism
towards a politics open to non-assimilationist claims of difference. These
claims redefine the national subject itself, as the nation becomes a
performative space for the articulation of competing visions.24
A postmodern nationalism, then, is cognizant of its social construction
and the contingency of its identity. The rigidity of the borders between the
"self' of nation and its "others" is relaxed. The focus shifts from the
inside/outside dichotomy to the relationship of social subjects articulating different visions in an ongoing dialogic relationship. Cultural specificity thus is not surrendered through assimilation. From this reworking
of nationalism emerges a new vision of citizenship which is not dependent upon the exclusive identification of the subject with the nation.
Instead, a shared notion of citizenship could develop based upon the
articulation of competing identities.
Postmodem national identity has a particular relevance to Canadian
nationalism. The success of Canada as a postmodern state is tied to its
failure as a "modem" nation. If a nation is ineluctably shaped by what it
opposes, then, for example, English Canadian identity now may be
shaped most strongly in opposition to the American national identity.
However, English speaking Canadians are aware of themselves as
"other" to what appears a stable, totalizing American nationalism. At the

23. Bhabha describes this in terms of the power of cultural difference; see ibid. at 312-13:
"The aim of cultural difference is to re-articulate the sum of knowledge from the perspective
of the signifying singularityof the 'other' that resists totalization.... [which] serves to disturb
the calculation of power and knowledge." The significance of cultural difference lies in its
potential for "the establishment of new forms of meaning, and strategies of identification,
through processes of negotiation where no discursive authority can be established without
revealing the difference of itself."
24. See H.K. Bhabha, "The Third Space" in Rutherford, ed., supra note 2,207 at 212-13: "It
is only by losing the sovereignty of the self that you can gain the freedom of a politics that is
open to the non-assimilationist claims of cultural difference. The critical feature of this new
awareness is that it doesn't need to totalise in order to legitimate political action or cultural
practice."
25. Indeed, it has been argued that the "New Europe" may provide a forum for the
incorporation of many of these ideas from postmodemism; see A. Huyssen, "The Inevitability
of Nation" in October, supra note 2, 65 at 71: "what may be desirable as a first modest step
might be a broad public debate about an alternative notion of nation, one that emphasizes
negotiated heterogeneity rather than homogeneity imposed from above, federalism rather than
centralism, regionalism as indeed an important layer of national identity rather than its alleged
opposite." Surely, these words could be transposed to the context of modem Canadian
federalism!
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same time, the relationship of English and Qu6b6cois identity depends
upon each as "other." Thus, it is difficult to speak of a Canadian national
identity if it is composed of at least two different national imaginaries.
Quebec, as the focus of a Francophone identity, understandably has a
more fixed political identity given the clearer contrast to an "other"namely, English speaking Canada.
From this provisionality in the Canadian identity there may be found
within the fabric of Canadian life a greater willingness to incorporate new
social movements and identities in terms of national citizenship. The
signifier "Canadian" displays a greater openness to reworking as a result
of an awareness that it is highly contingent and socially constructed. I
fully accept that Canadian history is replete with examples of the
oppression of identities that have been defined as outside the Canadian
national community. The aboriginal peoples provide a stark example of
how the rights of citizenship in both a formal and substantive sense have
been denied. My claim, however, is that the Canadian national imaginary
displays an instability which leaves it particularly open to contestation.
The contingency of the national sign facilitates the articulation of
competing identities deploying the language of nationalism. The use of
the term "First Nations," the existence of a Quebec national identity, or
other regional/provincial identities which come to be articulated in
nationalistic terms, exemplifies this phenomenon. Nationalism thus can
be appropriated and is never essentially fixed. This is the symptom of
politics in late modem society, "a politics in which no political subjects
are privileged, identities are never essentially fixed (or fixed by any
essence), and the signifiers mobilized to achieve recognition have no
intrinsically progressive or reactionary character. '26 No nation can ever
completely close its borders and achieve a "holistic, representative vision
of society"2 7 by denying the incorporation of new people into the field of
citizenship. Yet, there appears to be a "difference" within the Canadian
context. As Rosemary Coombe has argued, itis from "[t]he original 'lack'
(ofmeaning), which underpins the identity 'Canadian' [that] is the source
and the site for hegemonic articulations."2 8 Identity not only is defined by
an "othemess," but more generally by an absence. Thus, while there may
be an obsession with national boundaries within the Canadian psyche, it
stems from a self-reflexive awareness of the provisionality of national
identity within our cultural and political conditions.

26. R.J. Coombe, "Tactics of Appropriation and the Politics of Recognitionin Late Modem
Democracies" (1993) 21 Pol. Theory 411 at 412.
27. Ibid. at 419.
28. Ibid.
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II. Rethinking CanadianEquality Law
In this section, I apply the postmodern framework to the interpretation of
the equality provisions of the Charter.Canadian equality law is specifically aimed at those groups who have suffered historical or social
disadvantage. Indeed, I submit that the focus is on those defined as
"other" to the universal subject. What do the political conditions of
postmodernity imply then about how we conceive of a right to equality
within Canada? I argue that it provides apolitical and cultural explanation
for why Canadian equality rights are interpreted in an open-ended
fashion, and it provides the basis for a broader understanding of equality
in terms of the contestation of identities. A recognition that all identities,
including the national identity itself, are socially constructed suggests a
conscious openness to the interpretation of rights within the Canadian
constitutional framework. As Nitya Iyer has argued, "quests for essences
and identity, for simple, universal rules, for tidy labels and determinate
definitions (of equality or feminism or Canada) grounded in a fixed and
finite (constitutional) set of ideals must be relinquished."2 9 If there is
relatively little closure of the Canadian national identity, so too there can
be no essential determinate definition of what constitutes equality, no
universal rules that are applicable devoid of context. The "grand narrative" of equality or nationhood gives way to the ongoing revision of the
national identity through numerous (and sometimes antagonistic) local
discourses of what constitutes Canada.30
By way of background, it is important that the equality guarantees
within the Charter have facilitated an open-ended interpretation by
which individuals, as members of groups not explicitly recognized within
the Constitution, can claim rights to equality before and under the law.
The wording of section 15 allows for this interpretation. 1 From the
29. N. Duclos [now Iyer], "Lessons of Difference: Feminist Theory on Cultural Diversity"
(1990) 38 Buffalo L. Rev. 325 at 380-81.
30. Ido not deny the utopianism of this approach, nor do I wish to underestimate the existence
of historical and current practices of exclusion which deny to many Canadians the benefits of
full citizenship. My aim simply is to develop a model of full citizenship to which Canada might
be particularly well suited to aspire.
31. Section 15 of the Charter reads as follows:
15 (1). Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefitof the law without discrimination and, in particular, without
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or
mental or physical disability.
15 (2). Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its
object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including
those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion,
sex, age or mental or physical disability.
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outset, the Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted the equality guarantees in a "purposive" fashion. In Andrews v. Law Society of British
Columbia,32 the first case in which s.15 was interpreted, Mr. Justice
McIntyre, for the Court, elaborated upon the meaning of "discrimination"
for the purposes of Charterinterpretation:
I would say then that discrimination may be described as a distinction,
whether intentional or not but based on grounds relating to personal
characteristics of the individual or group, which has the effect of imposing
burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or group not
imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits access to opportunities,
33
benefits, and advantages available to other members of society.
From this definition of discrimination, the Supreme Court developed an
approach to s. 15 that turns on whether the claim rests upon grounds
either enumerated within s. 15 or analogous to those enumerated grounds
(race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or
physical disability). Thus, an analogy must be drawn between the
enumerated ground and the unenumerated basis in terms of the historical
or social disadvantage due to discriminatory treatment which has been
suffered by individuals because of membership in the group.
The focus on analogous grounds leaves open the expansion of the
bases upon which unconstitutional discriminatory treatment may be
found. This was explicitly recognized by Madam Justice Wilson, writing
in the Andrews case:
I believe also that it is important to note that the range of discrete and
insular minorities has changed and will continue to change with changing
political and social circumstances.... It can be anticipated that the
discrete and insular minorities of tomorrow will include groups not
recognized as such today. It is consistent with the constitutional status of
s. 15 that itbe interpreted with sufficient flexibility to ensure the "unremitting protection" of equality rights in the years to come. 34
As Madam Justice Wilson described, the question of whether a group
qualifies as analogous depends upon "the context of the place of the group
in the entire social, political and legal fabric of our society."35 Thus,
disadvantaged groups, whose basis of identification is not explicitly
recognized in s. 15, may still have recourse through the courts.
For example, the question whether sexual orientation constitutes a
recognized basis of discrimination for the purposes of s. 15 provides a
clear case of some courts' willingness to expand the range of protected

32. (1989), 56 DLR (4th) 1.

33. Ibid. at 18.
34. Ibid. at 33.
35. Ibid. at 32.
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grounds pursuant to which governmental discrimination is unconstitutional. After some initial hesitation, the uncontroverted trend in the law
has been to hold that "sexual orientation" provides an analogous ground
included within the rubric of s. 15. It should be noted, however, that the
Supreme Court of Canada has yet to rule directly on this issue. In Haig
v. Canada(MinisterofJustice),36 the Ontario Court of Appeal considered
whether the absence of sexual orientation from the list of proscribed
grounds of discrimination in s. 3 of the CanadianHuman Rights Act was
discriminatory as contrary to s. 15. The factual context of the case
concerned the dismissal of a Canadian Armed Forces officer on the basis
of his sexual orientation. The Ontario Court of Appeal held, first, that the
requisite degree of social disadvantage to justify inclusion within s. 15
was met by the category of sexual orientation:
The social context which must be considered includes the pain and
humiliation undergone by homosexuals by reason of prejudice towards
them. It also includes the enlightened evolution of human rights social and
legislative policy in Canada, since the end of the Second World War, both
provincially and federally. The failure to provide an avenue of redress for
prejudicial treatment of homosexual members of society and the possible
inference from the omission that such treatment is acceptable create the
effect of discrimination offending s. 15(1) of the Charter.'
The Court held that the CanadianHuman RightsAct must "be interpreted,
applied and administered as though it contained 'sexual orientation' as a
prohibited ground of discrimination."3 Thus, by virtue of the analogous
grounds approach, sexual orientation comes to be "read in" as a prohibited ground of discrimination under federal human rights law.
The general approach adopted by the courts and its specific application
to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation suggests a willingness
to recognize emergent identities within constitutional discourse and to
protect those who so identify themselves through the equality guarantees
of the Charter.While not all judges are sympathetic to this approach,
significant legal advances have been made. As Madam Justice Wilson
suggested inAndrews, the adaptability of what constitutes a "discrete and
insular minority" leaves s. 15 open as an avenue of action for some new
social movements as they coalesce and articulate demands. However,
within the interpretation of s. 15, a tension exists between the capacity for
growth and development of grounds for discrimination and a fixity or
"immutability" demanded of the group. That is, the "personal character-

36. (1992), 90.R. (3d) 495 (Ont. C.A.).
37. Ibid. at 503.
38. Ibid. at 508.
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istic" to which equality rights attach sometimes is explained and justified
on the basis of the difficulty of altering the characteristic. For example,
in Veysey v. Canada(CorrectionalService),3 9 a case which involved an
application by an inmate ofa correctional facility to participate in a family
visitation program with a same sex partner, the Federal Court Trial
Division held that sexual orientation satisfied the test of "analogous
grounds." The Court relied in part upon the fact that sexual orientation
was found sufficiently immutable to constitute a characteristic analogous
to the enumerated bases of discrimination. 40 Thus, while the categories of

discrimination are never closed, they might be limited to the extent that
the characteristic must be found unalterable. It may be that the analogous
grounds test demands that a characteristic cannot be described as assumed "at will." Rather, the fact that sexual orientation, in the eyes of the
judiciary, appears unalterable, fixed and central to identity, likely is
foundational to the willingness to accept it as a prohibited ground of
41
discrimination.
Furthermore, courts have been impressed with arguments relating to
a historical pattern of discrimination. For example, in Veysey the Court
reasoned that a history of prejudice was of particular relevance:
Another characteristic common to the enumerated grounds is that the
individuals or groups involved have been victimized and stigmatized
throughout history because of prejudice, mostly based on fear or ignorance, as most prejudices are. This characteristic would also clearly apply
to sexual orientation or, more precisely, to those who have deviated from
accepted sexual norms, at least in the eyes of the majority.4
This appeal to history may provide a further limitation upon the availability of the protection of the equality guarantees. A focus on historical
disadvantage obviously demands that the characteristic has some historical grounding. In other words, if one is dealing with a "new" social

39. (1989) 44 C.R.R. 364 (Fed. T.D.), affd 109 N.R. 300 (Fed. C.A.).
40. Ibid. at 370-71.
41. This approach can be contrasted to the American Equal Protection jurisprudence, in
which Courts in general have been reluctant to find governmental classifications based upon
sexual orientation to be subjectto heightenedjudicial scrutiny, reasoning that the characteristic
is not immutable. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense IndustrialSecurity Clearance Office,
895 F.2d563 (9th Cir.1990); Woodwardv. UnitedStates,871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989); BenShalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied (sub nom. Ben-Shalom v. Stone)
494 U.S. 1004 (1990). Very recently, some courts have found that governmental classifications
based upon sexual orientation fail "rational basis" review; see, e.g., Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57
(D.C. Cir. 1993), judgment vacated (7 January 1994), rehearing in banc granted; Selland v.
Aspin, 832 F.Supp. 12 (D.D.C. 1993); Dahlv. Secretaryof the UnitedStatesNavy, 830 F.Supp.
1319 (E.D.Cal. 1993); Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 1994 WL 238154 (W.D. Wash. 1994);
Meinhold v. United States DepartmentofDefense, 808 F.Supp. 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
42. Veysey, supra note 39 at 371.
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movement, the reasoning suggests that the characteristic must have some
historical recognition as a feature central to identity formation and that it
has been socially disadvantaged. In terms of the postmodern focus on the
provisionality and contingency of identities, the emphasis upon both
history and immutability is problematic. It seems to demand a
transhistorical and unalterable essence.
Despite these tensions, in my view the postmodem conception of
identities can assist in understanding the goals of equality rights in
Canada. This reexamination of equality through the lens ofpostmodernism
leads to an understanding of rights that focuses on dialogue and the
articulation of shifting and emerging identities. That dialogue dispels, to
some extent, the dichotomy of self/other which is the basis upon which
identities have been maintained. Through a communicative ethics that
demands a responsibility to the "other," a politics of difference and
multiplicity may replace a vision of rights that is reproduced from a
"universal" standpoint. The emphasis of equality rights, then, is on the
expression of identities defined in terms of difference. Moreover, a
community can envision rights as a means to nourish the development of
newly emergent group identities. A common communal identity thereby
comes to be centred on differences within and amongst the membership-on the multiplicity of subject positions that make up the commu43
nity and the individuals within it.
This relationship of identities has ramifications for our understanding
of a sexual identity. In particular, the debate between social construction-

43. This interpretation of equality rights to some extent is given credence in Native Women's
Assn. of Canadav. Canada(1992), 95 D.L.R. (4th) 106 (Fed. C.A.) [in according the advocates
of male-dominated aboriginal self-governments a preferred position in constitutional negotiations, the government took action which has the effect of restricting the freedom of expression
of aboriginal women in a manner offensive to ss. 2(b) and 28 of the Charter].Although the case
ultimately is decided on the basis of the guarantee of freedom of expression, it might be
interpreted as coming close to endorsing a dialogic right through the combination of the
constitutional guarantees of free expression and equality. In addition, the case is interesting for
the Court's explicit recognition of the multiplicity and intersection of identities along different
axes of oppression and for its readiness to define the right in issue in positive terms-a
requirement of fairness in government funding between groups.
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ist and essentialist theories of sexuality can be addressed.' The focus on
difference, contingency and redefinition suggests that a sexual identity,
like all other identities, has a constructedness that is open to alteration.
"Homosexuality" as an identity concept thus can be taken "into the realm
of social and discursive formations."'45 Many theorists of sexuality have
argued that the "homosexual" identity is a product of a particular
historical period and its coherence is undercut by the postmodern challenge to the stability of all identity categories.4 6 Indeed, we have entered
a period in which a gay identity increasingly is given articulation and is
open to expression in new forms. A gay identity becomes unstable and
provisional, and it may well prove to be the paradigmatic postmodern
identity:
Framing gay identity as an emerging sociohistorical event, as an unstable
contestable institutional/discursive production and strategy, provided
gays with a rationale to begin seeing themselves as having multiple
identities, recognizing multiple, sometimes contradictory positions of
social power and oppression, and seeing their own fight for sexual/social

44. For an introduction to the debate, see E. Stein, ed., Formsof Desire: Sexual Orientation
and the Social ConstructionistControversy (New York: Routledge, 1992). The terms of the
debate have been summarized by S. Epstein, "Gay Politics, Ethnic Identity: The Limits of
Social Constructionism" in Stein, ed., ibid., 239 at 250-51:
Where essentialism took for granted that all societies consist of people who are either
heterosexuals or homosexuals (with perhaps some bisexuals), constructionists demonstrated that the notion of "the homosexual" is a sociohistorical product, not universally
applicable, and worthy of explanation in its own right. And where essentialism would
treat the self-attribution of a "homosexual identity" as unproblematic-as simply the
conscious recognition of a true, underlying "orientation"--constructionism focused
attention on identity as a complex developmental outcome, the consequence of an
interactive process of social labeling and self-identification.
45. D. Fuss, EssentiallySpeaking (New York: Roufledge, 1989) at 109.
46. In particular, see ibid. at 104: "identity itselfis contingent.... [S]uch a view of identity
as unstable and potentially disruptive, as alien and incoherent, could in the end produce a more
mature identity politics by militating against the tendency to erase differences and inconsistencies in the production of stable political subjects."
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empowerment as47 connected to struggles around gender, race, ethnicity,
class, and so on.

Through a focus on contingency, one can avoid the "totalizing" of
sexuality and sexual practices as identity categories. As Steven Epstein
has argued, "deviant identities are particularly likely to assume totalizing
dimensions: all behavior of persons so categorized becomes interpreted
by others through the prism of the perceived difference."4' In other words,
a social constructionist understanding of sexuality contests its singularity
as an identity category. This is closely related to the postmodern focus on
identity as multiplicitous, constructed and a product of discourse.
If this framework demands that "[w]e must be able to speak of sexually
based group identities without assuming either that the group has some
mystical or biological unity, or that the 'group' doesn't exist," 49 then a
focus on immutability in the analysis of sexual orientation is theoretically
misplaced. On the other hand, the willingness of social actors to accept
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as illegitimate in part
results from the acceptance of essentialist arguments concerning the
"nature" of "homosexuality." Specifically, lesbians and gay men "deserve" legal protection because of the immutability of the identity
category (i.e., "we can't help who we are") and the history of prejudice
and discrimination (i.e., "homosexuals have been persecuted"). While I
fully accept and experience the continued existence of prejudice against
lesbians and gay men at all levels of society, a focus on history reinforces
the category of "the homosexual" as unchanging, static and historically
and culturally invariant. In other words, it reproduces a modernist,
totalizing, and essentialist conception of identity.
At the same time, the use of essentialist arguments continues to have
a resonance and persuasiveness. Moreover, reliance upon essentialist

47. S.Seidman, "Postmodem Anxiety: The Politics of Epistemology" (1991) 9:2 Sociol.
Theory 180 at 183. See also C.S. Vance, "Social Construction Theory: Problems in the History
of Sexuality" in H. Crowley & S. Himmelweit, eds., Knowing Women: Feminism and
Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: Polity Press, 1992) 132 at 134:
At minimum, all social construction approaches adopt the view thatphysically identical
sexual acts may have varying social significance and subjective meaning depending on
how they are defined and understood in different cultures and historical periods.
Because a sexual act does not carry with it a universal social meaning, it follows that
the relationship between sexual acts and sexual identities is not a fixed one, and it is
projected from the observer's time and place to others at great peril. Cultures provide
widely different categories, schemata and labels for framing sexual and affective
experiences. The relationship of sexual act and identity to sexual community is equally
variable and complex.
48. Epstein, supra note 44 at 269-70.
49. Ibid. at 289.
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claims of sexuality may lead to legal advances. Carole Vance has
identified this phenomenon in the American legal and political context:
gay politicos and lobbyists find it helpful in the short run to respond with
assertions about gays through the ages, to assert a claim to a natural group
status, and to insist that being gay is an essential, inborn trait about which
there is no choice.... By dint of repetition, ideas about gay essentialism
were reinforced in the contemporary gay movement (though they were
hardly unknown in American culture) and, more importantly, linked to
group advancement, success and self-affirmation."
The tension between constructionist and essentialist understandings of
sexuality in legal discourse is understandable. By articulating a group
identity-a "difference" from society as a whole-a partial fixity in the
category is necessary to provide coherence. At the same time, postmodern
theory suggests that identities are inherently unstable. Yet, as a strategic
matter, it may be advantageous to describe identities in essentialist
terms. 51Epstein has referred to this conundrum as the "paradox of identity
politics"52 because of the difficulty of asserting an identity without
53
assuming a "'totalizing' sameness within the group.
That tendency towards totalization is problematic, because it replicates the boundaries through which a dichotomy of inside/outside is
structured around the identity concept. One of the focal points of identity
theory is the way in which the universal subject position has been
constructed through the erection of boundaries. For example, the establishment of a universal sexual subject was dependent upon the denial of
sexual subjectivity to lesbians and gay men. To prevent the erosion of the
stable heterosexual subject, the creation of a negative image of the
outsider must be attached to "the homosexual. ' 54 The need to maintain
boundaries is not unique to the sexual subject. The individual associates
herself with numerous identity categories. She therefore may be located

50. Vance, supra note 47 at 142.

51. Indeed, in the American context, difficulty in achieving protection for lesbians and gay
men under the Equal Protection clause of the Constitution in part can be traced to the failure

of essentialist notions of the immutability of one's sexual orientation; see supra note 41.
52. Epstein, supra note 44 at 291.

53. Ibid.
54. On this point, seeD.Fuss, "Inside/Out"in D.Fuss, ed.,Inside/Out:Lesbian Theories,Gay
Theories (New York: Routledge, 1991) 1 at 3:
To protect against the recognition of the lack within the self, the self erects and defends
its borders against an other which is made to represent or to become that selfsame lack.
But borders are notoriously unstable, and sexual identities rarely secure.... Mhose
inhabiting the inside.., can only comprehend the outside through the incorporation of
a negative image. This process of negative interiorization involves turning homosexuality inside out, exposing not the homosexual's abjectinsides but the homosexual as the
abject, as the contaminated and expurgated insides of the heterosexual subject.

A Postmodern Constitutionalism

both at positions of privilege and "otherness," which in turn may be
subject to change over time. Subject locations compete within this
framework for status, revealing the provisionality of a subject position.
The emptiness of the signifiers of identity means that they can be
"essentialized" by the construction of a subject position in contradistinction to an "other." However, it is "more than a simple boundary marking
the outer limits of the centred term because it functions as a supplement,
marking what the centre lacks but also what it needs in order to define
fully and confirm its identity."55
It is through a partial fixity of identity that new social movements
emerge and make claims to "rights." The acceptance of these claims
expands the frontiers of the universal subject position as the group is
accommodated. For example, a claim to rights for a minority sexual
identity does not simply expand the realm of the universal sexual subject,
it also "decentres the dominant discourses and identities that have
suppressed it."'56 Sexual subjectivity is redefined in the process. 57 Indeed,
subject positions inevitably are open to decentring by the "other" against
which they have been constituted." Consequently, the articulation of a
newly emergent identity must be made with an awareness of its own
provisionality. As Joan Scott argues, "the project of history is not to reify
identity but to understand its production as an ongoing process of
differentiation, relentless in its repetition, but also ... subject to redefinition, resistance, and change."5 9

55. J. Rutherford, "A Place Called Home: Identity and the Cultural Politics of Difference" in
Rutherford, ed., supra note 2, 9 at 22.

56. Ibid. at 23.
57. As Elizabeth Spelman has argued, this capacity to rework existing identity structures can
have positive effects on disadvantaged groups; see E. Spelman, InessentialWoman (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1988) at 152:
if we think about identities and points of similarity and difference as things that are
always being negotiated and challenged, we may think more about ways in which these
categories depend upon the particular purposes of those who create and maintain
them.... It often seems as if none of us created these categories but all of us help to
maintain them. But insofar as we feel moved to do battle over them, we exhibit both a
sense of being subject to them against ourwill and a sense of being able to do something
about the power they have over the articulation of our identities and thus over our social
and political positions to the extent that they depend on those identities.
58. See C. Mouffe, "Feminism, Citizenship, and Radical Democratic Politics" in Butler &
Scott, eds., supra note 11, 369 at 372-73: "Even though there is no necessary link between
different subject positions, in the field of politics there are always discourses that try to provide
an articulation from different standpoints. For that reason every subject position is constituted
within an essentially unstable discursive structure since it is submitted to a variety of
articulatory practices that constantly subvert and transform it."
59. J. Scott, "Multiculturalism and the Politics of Identity" in October, supranote 2, 12 at 19.
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This contingency in our conception both of equality and of nationhood
can provide fresh insights into a consideration of Canadian equality
jurisprudence dealing with "sexual orientation" as an analogous ground
of discrimination. In particular, the decision in Haig assumes a new
significance. The facts concerned the application of the Canadian Armed
Forces' policy directive relating to "homosexuals" in the Forces. Haig
was told, upon informing his commanding officer of his homosexuality,
that he would "cease to be eligible for promotions, postings or further
military career training. ' 60 While the legal question was the constitutionality of the absence of protection against discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation in the CanadianHuman Rights Act, the substance of
the case raised the issue of lesbians and gay men in the military.
Subsequently, the government lifted the policy as a result of a settlement
reached in litigation brought by a member of the Armed Forces, Michelle
Douglas, who had been released because of her sexual orientation.61 The
decision of the government speaks not only to identity in relation to
sexual orientation, but also is relevant to how the Canadian national
identity is imagined. While the power of law to shape the national
imaginary at best is partial, the presence of openly lesbian or gay
members in the armed services is significant. The military is an important
signifier of national identity in many states. It is linked to the boundaries
of national identity, for it is charged with protecting the literal, physical
boundaries by providing protection against invasion by the "outsider."
Thus, the military is a powerful, central signifier of nationalism and can
be expected to reflect the national identity. The relative readiness of the
Canadian government and society to open up this national sign to
resignification (albeit with some dissent) along the lines of sexual
orientation consequently is noteworthy and can be contrasted to the
American experience. In the United States, the courts in the past have
rejected the substance of the claim that the ban on lesbians and gay men
in the American forces is contrary to the Equal Protection clause of the
United States Constitution. 62 This can be explained in part by the
importance that America attaches to the maintenance of the separation of
a military identity from a gay identity.63 In one case, for example, the
60. Supra note 36 at 497.
61. See Douglasv. Canada(1992), 12 C.R.R. (2d) 284 (Fed. T.D.).
62. See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v.Marsh,supra note 41; Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F.Supp. I(D.D.C.
1991). Recently, this trend appears to be changing; see Meinhold v. Departmentof Defense,
supra note 41; Steffan v. Aspin, supranote 41; Cammermeyer v. Aspin, supra note 41; Dahl
v. Secretaryof the UnitedStates Navy, supra note 41; Sellandv. Aspin, supra note 41; Able v.

United States, No. CV 94-0974 (D.C. E.N.Y. 1994).
63. See C. Stychin, "Inside and Out of the Military" (1993) 3 Law & Sexuality: Rev. Lesbian
& Gay Legal Issues 27.
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judgment repeatedly draws upon images of boundary crossing and the
Court finds itself compelled to police the boundaries of the military by
inscribing a gay identity with an "otherness" to the heterosexual military
American subject.6 It attempts to restore the naturalness and essence of
the signifier of the American military machine by expelling gay soldiers
and preventing them from rearticulating the sign in a new, unauthorized
65
manner.
In the Canadian context, however, the military has served neither the
same literal function of constant safeguarding of the national borders, nor
does it appear to serve the same metaphoric function of border patrol.
Indeed, the military simply may be a weak signifier of national identity,
which in itself is noteworthy. The Canadian Armed Forces can accommodate lesbian and gay identities, which, in turn, may redefine the military
subject. The national imaginary thus has an openness to difference and
the Armed Forces have become a site for the contestation of images of
national identity. In other words, the fact that the national identity is
socially constructed and defined by the articulation of numerous, shifting
identities, facilitates the expression of a gay identity within national
institutions. In the course of the ongoing dialogue over equality rights, the
Canadian military comes to be reworked. In this respect, it may be
significant that today the primary role of the Canadian Armed Forces is
in peacekeeping operations abroad. One of the goals of the intervention
of peacekeeping troops is to facilitate dialogue and rapprochmentbetween opposed parties, rather than to police the boundaries of the
Canadiannation. 66 Finally, the fact that a gay identity can be articulated
in military terms serves to redefine the meaning of that identity as well,
demonstrating once again its social construction.
Nationalisms and sexualities thus meet and, in the Canadian context,
a sexual identity is openly allowed to cross into the borders of the national
imaginary, which in turn redefines the scope of citizenship. The consequences of a new identity within the national discourse are unpredictable.
While I would hope that the emergence of a gay identity within Canadian
national institutions might give the signifiers of nationality a new "queer"
inflection, such a result cannot be predicted. 67 Moreover, given the ability

64. Steffan v. Cheney, supra note 62, rev'd (sub nom. Steffan v. Aspin) supra note 41.

65. Ibid.
66. I am indebted to Professor Kathie Brock for this insight.
67.

I choose not to define what I mean here by the use of"queer," as I utilize it as a term that

has come to denote, in some sexual subcultures, the transgressive power of numerous minority
sexualities. A queer identity also might redefine and subvert the articulated identities of

lesbians and gay men.
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of the Canadian national identity to incorporate subjects defined in
diverse nationalist terms, Canadian social and political discourse might
be conducive to the articulation of new sexual identities, such as Queer
Nationalism." Coinciding with the aims of Queer Nationals, Canada
might be a space where "the boundaries between what constitutes
individual and what constitutes national space are explicitly blurred."6 9
This process is facilitated by the emergence of new voices articulating
demands for inclusion in the national imaginary in the name of equality
rights.
IV. Conclusion: The Future of a PostmodernNationalIdentity
The characterization of Canada as a postmodem state begs the question
of whether such a nation ultimately can survive. If a postmodern national
identity is one in which its citizens are aware of the contingency of nation
and the multiplicity of their own identities, to what extent can national
identity alone bind the members together? How are the various identities
with which citizens identify prevented from redefining themselves in
nationalistic terms to the exclusion of a Canadian national identity? This
raises whether there is an inevitable process of disintegration and fragmentation of the nation in the conditions of postmodemity. Thus, if
Canada is the first postmodern state, will it also be one of the first to
dissolve in this current political situation?
Of course, the answers to these questions are beyond the scope of this
article. However, an awareness of the constructed character of nationhood may render more problematic the maintenance of the bonds of
citizenship through which the integration of a nation is maintained. The
openness of the signifiers of Canada suggests that emotional appeals to
nationhood may prove unsuccessful. The sentimental deployment of
nationalism is futile if the mysteries and essentialism of the nation are
stripped away. While demands of undivided loyalty to the state are

68. In general, see L. Berlant & E. Freeman, "Queer Nationality" (1992) 19:1 Bound. 149.
Berlant and Freeman argue that the phenomenon of "queer nationality" has "taken up the
project of coordinating a new nationality. Its relation to nationhood is multiple and ambiguous,
however, taking as much from the insurgent nationalisms of oppressed peoples as from the
revolutionary idealism of the United States" (ibid. at 151). As a primarily American phenomenon, it is difficult to graft such a movement into a Canadian context. However, it is possible
that the goals of Queer Nation which include the attempt to cross the boundaries between
individual and national space and to radically reconstitute notions of citizenship, might be more
readily incorporated within a national discourse that is substantially more open to new
nationalist articulations of identity. On the other hand, that fact alone might rob Queer
Nationals of their radicalism.
69. Ibid. at 161.
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incompatible with the multiplicity of identifications of the citizen, some
conception of loyalty might still prove necessary to prevent the rupture
of the nation into its various component parts. Loyalty, however, must be
broadened to encompass the loyalty of the subject to a variety of
communities and subcultures. It may well be that loyalty now only can be
expected and only will be forthcoming in those circumstances where the
individual is convinced that through membership in the postmodem state,
the right to identify variously and to express her identities will best be
secured. Loyalty thus stems precisely from the values which underpin the
equality guarantees of the Charter.A commitment to equality of participation within a dialogic community is a precondition to loyalty to the
state. In other words, it is only through a commitment to the security and
flourishing of difference that loyalty will be received.
The self-reflexivity of the individual leads to an awareness that the
alternatives facing the social order when confronted with difference are
dialogue between and among those different identities and the violence
(metaphoric and literal) of separation and disintegration. An irreconcilable tension necessarily exists between these two forces, which cannot be
transcended. Loyalty to the dialogic community in principle and in
operation thus depends upon the success of the state in controlling the
impulse towards complete fragmentation and its accompanying psychic
and physical pain. This definition of loyalty never claims to be totalizing
for it emerges out of the complexity of allegiances of citizens, rather than
from the essentialism of a totalizing and homogeneous nation. Finally, it
is through a dialogic relationship that moments of crisis, communal and
personal, can be resolved through communication. These moments
emerge when identities conflict and loyalties collide. These crises must
be dampened by the larger community to control the instinct towards exit
from the state.
Thus, in conclusion, I have argued that through a postmodern understanding of identity and a postmodern identity politics we can deepen and
broaden our conception of equality within Canadian law and society. I
advocate an anti-essentialist approach that reflects the fragmentation of
the Canadian national identity. The recognition of sexual orientation as
a prohibited ground of discrimination exemplifies this vision, which
centres upon an ideal of equality based on the right to articulate an identity
in the public sphere. It represents a different interpretation of equality
rights in which the protection of newly emergent identities is ensured and
participation in a democratic dialogue of rights is guaranteed. This
approach ultimately demands a rethinking of rights such that they no
longer depend upon a universal standpoint which has denied to some the
articulation of subjecthood. Instead, in the place of universality, there
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emerges a focus on difference and a communal and national identity
forged from difference. In so doing, an attempt is made to minimize the
exclusionary power of communities as an appropriate model of equality
rights in Canada. The national identity thus is revealed as a permanent site
of contestation over the meaning of nationhood. The nation comes to have
a heightened capacity for redefinition and thus is explicitly constructed
through an ongoing dialogue involving competing social imaginaries.
Such a vision of nation may be more open to the intersection of different
identities and facilitates the development of a liberatory imagination of
rights based on a multiplicity of identities as an alternative to universal
rights and a totalized, one dimensional subjectivity.

